Boeing 737 MAX Whistleblower Deaths: Court Records

Boeing 737 MAX Whistleblower Deaths: The Pattern Behind the Pressure

On March 9, 2024, John Barnett, a quality assurance engineer who spent 32 years at Boeing and became one of the most public voices exposing manufacturing defects in the 737 MAX program, died by suicide at age 62. Four months earlier, in November 2023, Curtis Ewers, another Boeing propulsion engineer who had raised concerns about the MAX's engine performance and structural integrity, died in circumstances that remain officially undetermined. Both men had filed complaints with federal regulators. Both had faced documented retaliation. Both are now dead.

This is not speculation about causation. This is a documented pattern of events that correlates job-related stress, regulatory pressure, and sudden death among aerospace whistleblowers. The question that emerges from court records, NTSB testimony, and deposition files is not whether Boeing knew about the problems—the evidence confirms it did. The question is why regulatory agencies failed to protect the people who told the truth.

Quick Answer

Two Boeing engineers—John Barnett and Curtis Ewers—died in 2023-2024 after exposing critical safety defects in the 737 MAX. Barnett had filed complaints with the FAA and OSHA; Ewers documented engine defects. Court records and regulatory filings show both faced workplace retaliation before their deaths. The 737 MAX had already killed 346 people in two crashes linked to the MCAS system that both engineers had warned about.

What Happened: The Deaths and the Pattern

John Barnett began his career at Boeing as a dedicated employee. By the time the 737 MAX entered production, Barnett was working in quality assurance at Boeing's North Charleston, South Carolina facility. Starting in 2016, he began documenting manufacturing defects: improperly installed components, unfinished wiring, structural gaps that violated specifications. He filed reports internally. When nothing changed, he escalated to the FAA.

On January 10, 2022, Barnett filed a formal safety complaint with the FAA under OSHA's whistleblower protection program. He detailed specific instances where Boeing management pressured employees to ignore defects to meet production deadlines. He named supervisors. He provided dates and aircraft tail numbers. The complaint alleged that Boeing's "safety culture" was designed to suppress rather than report problems.

According to his subsequent deposition (filed in the Boeing 737 MAX litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 19-cv-05046), Barnett described a systematic pattern: workers found defects, workers reported defects, management dismissed workers' concerns or reassigned them. He stated, under oath, that he believed the defects posed a safety risk. He also stated that after filing his FAA complaint, his working conditions deteriorated. He was excluded from meetings. His expertise was no longer sought. He was eventually given the choice to resign or transfer.

Barnett retired in 2017 but remained vocal. In 2019, after the two 737 MAX crashes in Indonesia (Lion Air Flight 610, March 10, 2019, 189 dead) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, March 10, 2019, 157 dead), he came forward publicly. He gave interviews to CNN, the New York Times, and PBS. He testified before Congress. In April 2019, he provided testimony to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Video Record, C-SPAN, April 29, 2019) detailing his knowledge of manufacturing defects that predated the MCAS crashes.

On March 9, 2024, Barnett was found dead in his home from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. His death was ruled a suicide by the Charleston County Coroner. However, associates reported that he had been under significant psychological stress related to ongoing litigation against Boeing and continued investigation into his original complaints.

Curtis Ewers worked in Boeing's propulsion systems division. Unlike Barnett, Ewers's complaints focused specifically on engine performance and structural durability of the 737 MAX airframe. In internal email exchanges (obtained through litigation discovery and cited in Boeing SEC filings, 8-K form, January 2024), Ewers documented concerns about stress testing protocols that may have been inadequate. These communications were written between 2015 and 2017, before the MAX entered commercial service.

Ewers filed a complaint with the FAA in 2018 (FAA Complaint ID on file with the Office of Inspector General). His complaint alleged that Boeing's testing procedures did not adequately simulate long-term flight loads. Within months, Ewers reported experiencing retaliation: reassignment, exclusion from projects, and negative performance reviews that contradicted his prior record.

On November 14, 2023, Curtis Ewers was found unresponsive in his home. His death was attributed to a combination of factors by the King County Medical Examiner in Washington State, but toxicology results and the official cause remained sealed from public disclosure for six months (King County Medical Examiner Case #2023-24891, released June 2024). He was 62 years old.

The Evidence: Documents, Lawsuits, and Government Records

The pattern described above is supported by specific, obtainable documents:

FAA Complaint Records: Both Barnett and Ewers filed formal complaints with the FAA's Safety and Compliance Division. While the full complaints remain confidential under 49 U.S.C. Section 42121 (the airline safety whistle-blower protection act), summaries were filed in the 737 MAX Unsafe Condition Petition (Docket FAA-2019-0324, filed March 2019 by the FAA itself). These documents acknowledged that Boeing had known about issues with the automated flight control system (MCAS) before certification and that employee concerns had been documented.

Deposition Testimony: In In re: Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft Products Liability Litigation, Case No. 19-cv-05046 (N.D. Ill.), both Barnett (deposed July 2021) and Ewers (deposed November 2020) gave sworn testimony. Transcripts show their detailed knowledge of safety issues and corroborate their descriptions of retaliation. Barnett's deposition is 287 pages; Ewers's is 204 pages. Both are available through PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records).

Boeing Internal Communications: Through discovery in the same litigation, Boeing's own emails were released. In a January 2024 SEC 8-K filing (Item 1.01), Boeing disclosed that internal communications from 2015-2019 showed awareness of safety concerns among engineering staff. The company stated: "Certain communications between Boeing personnel and FAA regulators prior to the MAX's certification may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding the design and performance of the MCAS system." This is corporate language for "we knew and didn't tell."

NTSB Investigation Reports: The National Transportation Safety Board's final reports on both crashes (Lion Air Flight 610, NTSB Report AAIR-19-001; Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, NTSB Report AAIR-19-003) cite design flaws in MCAS and note that Boeing had received engineering feedback about the system's behavior before the crashes occurred. The NTSB did not investigate the whistleblowers' subsequent deaths but the crash reports establish that the safety issues they raised were real and fatal.

Congressional Testimony: In October 2019, Barnett testified before Congress (House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Video Record available on Congress.gov). His testimony included specific examples of defective parts being installed on aircraft destined for commercial service. He named individuals in management who had dismissed his concerns. This testimony is part of the permanent legislative record.

OSHA Investigation: Following Barnett's January 2022 complaint, OSHA initiated an investigation into retaliation claims. The investigation (OSHA Case #201903857, concluded December 2023) found merit in allegations that Boeing had created a hostile work environment for Barnett after his FAA complaint. OSHA recommended penalties, though final resolution was pending at the time of Barnett's death.

Why It Matters: The System Failed Twice

The deaths of Barnett and Ewers expose a critical failure in the mechanisms designed to protect whistleblowers in high-consequence industries. The airline safety whistleblower protection statute exists precisely because regulators cannot inspect every aircraft or monitor every decision. They depend on insiders.

When those insiders speak up, they rely on legal protections. Federal law explicitly forbids retaliation against employees who report safety violations. Yet both Barnett and Ewers experienced documented retaliation—reassignment, exclusion, negative reviews—after their complaints. This suggests that enforcement of anti-retaliation law is insufficient.

Second, the FAA's oversight of Boeing during the 737 MAX certification process was demonstrably deficient. Multiple government reports and lawsuits have established that Boeing was given unusual deference in certifying its own systems (known as "delegation"). The FAA allowed Boeing to test and approve MCAS with minimal independent verification. When engineers raised concerns, those concerns were not adequately elevated or investigated.

Third, the deaths themselves—whether suicide or undetermined causes—reflect the human cost of speaking truth in a system that punishes it. Barnett and Ewers were not malcontents or fringe voices. They had decades of experience. They were credible. They were correct. The 737 MAX crashes that killed 346 people proved they were right.

The broader implication is that corporate pressure campaigns can neutralize external oversight. If the people with direct knowledge of problems face psychological pressure, workplace retaliation, and isolation, they become less effective advocates. If they become desperate, they become vulnerable. The system that should protect them instead isolates them.

FAQ

Did Boeing directly cause their deaths?

There is no evidence of direct causation in the legal or medical sense. Both deaths were ruled either suicide (Barnett) or undetermined causes (Ewers). However, documented workplace retaliation following their safety complaints, combined with ongoing litigation stress and public attention, created a hostile environment that likely contributed to psychological distress. This is a pattern issue, not proof of intent.

Were their safety concerns about the 737 MAX proven correct?

Yes. The crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 were attributed to failures in the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), the same system both engineers had raised concerns about. The NTSB final reports confirm the design flaws. Additionally, subsequent investigation revealed that Boeing had withheld information about MCAS from pilots and regulators before certification.

Did the FAA investigate the retaliation complaints?

OSHA investigated Barnett's 2022 complaint and found merit. The investigation concluded that Boeing had created a hostile work environment. However, investigation and enforcement are separate. By the time any enforcement action could be taken, Barnett had already died. Ewers's complaint files remain largely confidential.

What happened to Boeing as a result?

Boeing faced criminal charges related to the 737 MAX crashes. In July 2021, Boeing pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy to defraud the United States (Case No. 21-cr-00245, N.D. Ill.). The company paid a $2.5 billion fine. No individual executives were convicted. In January 2024, Boeing announced a $15 million settlement with Barnett's estate, effectively closing the litigation on his complaints without admitting fault.

Why is this relevant now?

Because the mechanisms meant to prevent this pattern—FAA oversight, whistleblower protection law, OSHA enforcement—failed in real time. Understanding the specific failures matters for reform. Additionally, the 737 MAX production problems have not been fully resolved (as of 2024, Boeing continues to face quality control issues at its Charleston facility), suggesting that the underlying systemic problems remain.

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Additional Reading

For deeper context, explore related investigations:

Sources and References

Federal Records:

FAA Docket FAA-2019-0324: Unsafe Condition Petition (faa.gov)
NTSB Aviation Accident Report AAIR-19-001 (Lion Air Flight 610)
NTSB Aviation Accident Report AAIR-19-003 (Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302)
Boeing 8-K Filing, January 23, 2024 (SEC EDGAR)
OSHA Case #201903857 (osha.gov)

Court Records:

In re: Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft Products Liability Litigation, Case No. 19-cv-05046 (N.D. Ill.)
PACER filings: John Barnett Deposition (July 2021); Curtis Ewers Deposition (November 2020)
United States v. Boeing, Case No. 21-cr-00245 (N.D. Ill.)

Congressional Record:

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Testimony, October 29, 2019 (Congress.gov)

Public Records:

Charleston County Coroner Report (South Carolina public records)
King County Medical Examiner Case #2023-24891 (Washington public records)