Investigation revealed the FBI built a network of 15,000+ informants post-9/11 who acted as agent provocateurs, providing not just information but the actual plans, weapons, and opportunity for terror plots. Analysis of every terrorism prosecution from 2001-2013 found at least 50 defendants were on trial for conduct directly spurred by FBI informants. The entrapment defense has never succeeded in a terrorism case.
“The FBI is spending $3 billion a year to manufacture terrorist plots, using informants who provide the plan, the means, and the target, then arresting people who never could have done it alone.”
From “crazy” to confirmed
The Claim Is Made
This is the moment they called it crazy.
When federal prosecutors announced terrorism convictions in the years after 9/11, they presented them as victories against a persistent enemy plotting from within America's borders. What they didn't always disclose was how much of the plotting came from the government itself.
The claim emerged gradually through investigative reporting and legal challenges: the FBI had assembled a network of over 15,000 informants and undercover operatives whose role extended far beyond gathering intelligence. These agents, often called "confidential human sources," weren't just listening—they were actively constructing the plots they were ostensibly trying to prevent.
When civil liberties advocates and journalists first raised these concerns in the early 2010s, law enforcement pushed back hard. The FBI maintained that its informants were passive sources of information, that they merely reported what terrorists were planning. Prosecutors argued that defendants chose to commit these acts, and that an informant's involvement didn't negate culpability. The official position was reassuring: the system had checks and balances.
But the evidence told a different story. The Intercept's investigation into FBI informant operations documented case after case where the government didn't just stumble upon a plot—it created one. In some instances, informants posed as weapons suppliers, providing explosives or cash. In others, they acted as the ringleader, convincing reluctant or unstable individuals that a terrorist attack was possible and desirable. The informants supplied not just the idea but the means and the motivation.
Analysis of terrorism prosecutions from 2001 to 2013 revealed at least 50 defendants were on trial primarily for conduct directly instigated by FBI informants. These weren't hardened operatives; many were vulnerable individuals—some mentally unstable, some economically desperate—who likely would never have committed any crime without the government's intervention. Yet they faced severe federal sentences nonetheless.
Get the 5 biggest receipts every week, straight to your inbox — plus an exclusive PDF: The Top 10 Conspiracy Theories Proven True in 2025-2026. No spam. No agenda. Just the papers they couldn't hide.
You just read "The FBI used 15,000 informants to manufacture terror plots, …". We send ones like this every week.
No one's said anything yet. Be the first to drop your take.
Confirmed: They Were Right
The truth comes out. Officially documented.
Confirmed: They Were Right
The truth comes out. Officially documented.
The most striking aspect of this system's durability is its legal immunity. The entrapment defense, which theoretically exists to protect citizens from government overreach, has never successfully been used in a terrorism case. Courts have consistently rejected it, reasoning that someone willing to be enticed into terrorism must have had some predisposition toward it. This creates a perverse incentive: the FBI can build increasingly elaborate schemes with minimal legal risk.
What makes this partially verified rather than fully confirmed is the lack of official transparency. The FBI has never released comprehensive data on how many operations involved informant-provided materials or ideas versus genuine, independently-planned attacks. The number of 15,000+ informants comes from public reporting and FOIA documents, but the full scope of the practice remains classified.
This matters because it fundamentally changes how we should understand post-9/11 security claims. When the government announces a terrorism prevention, we should ask: who initiated contact? Who provided the plan? Who supplied the means? Without knowing these details, we cannot distinguish between legitimate law enforcement and entrapment dressed as prevention.
The erosion of public trust isn't accidental. It flows directly from a system where the incentives reward quantity of convictions over quality of cases, where informants profit from each plot they help construct, and where courts have abandoned the entrapment doctrine. Until that changes, skepticism toward official terrorism narratives isn't paranoia—it's reasonable caution.
Beat the odds
This had a 0.1% chance of leaking — someone talked anyway.
Conspirators
~500Large op
Secret kept
0.5 years
Time to 95% exposure
500+ years
