The primary intelligence used to justify the 2003 Iraq invasion came from an Iraqi defector codenamed 'Curveball' (Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi), who later admitted he fabricated his claims about mobile biological weapons labs. German intelligence (BND) had warned the CIA that Curveball was unreliable. Colin Powell's UN presentation relied heavily on this fabricated intelligence. No WMDs were ever found in Iraq.
“The intelligence on Iraqi WMDs is being fabricated or exaggerated to justify a predetermined invasion. There are no weapons of mass destruction.”
What they said vs. what the evidence shows
“Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”
— Secretary of State Colin Powell · Feb 2003
SourceFrom “crazy” to confirmed
The Claim Is Made
This is the moment they called it crazy.
On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell stood before the United Nations Security Council and made the case for war. He held up a vial, spoke gravely about mobile biological weapons laboratories, and presented satellite imagery and intercepted communications as proof. Within weeks, the United States invaded Iraq. Within months, weapons inspectors began searching. They found nothing. What Powell didn't know—or wasn't told—was that his most critical piece of evidence came from a man who later admitted he had lied.
That man was Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, an Iraqi defector known in intelligence circles as "Curveball." He had been debriefed extensively by German intelligence, the BND, and his accounts of mobile biological weapons labs formed the backbone of the CIA's assessment that Saddam Hussein possessed active WMD programs. Powell's UN presentation leaned heavily on Curveball's claims. The intelligence agencies treated him as credible. The public was persuaded.
But there was a problem that few officials acknowledged at the time: the Germans didn't trust him. According to multiple accounts, including reporting by CBS's 60 Minutes, German intelligence had warned the CIA that Curveball was unreliable. He had fabricated stories before. His information couldn't be independently verified. These warnings were either downplayed or ignored as the Bush administration built its case for invasion.
Years later, after no weapons were found—not in 2003, not in 2004, not ever—the truth began to emerge. The 2005 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding WMD investigated what went wrong. They confirmed what critics had suspected: the intelligence community had constructed a narrative around a single source whose credibility was questionable from the start. Curveball himself eventually admitted that he had fabricated his claims. He had never seen the mobile labs. He invented details to please his handlers.
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Confirmed: They Were Right
The truth comes out. Officially documented.
Confirmed: They Were Right
The truth comes out. Officially documented.
The invasion of Iraq killed hundreds of thousands of people. It cost nearly $2 trillion. It destabilized an entire region and contributed to the rise of extremist groups. And it was launched on the basis of intelligence that one man invented, that one allied intelligence service had warned against trusting, and that the American government presented to the world as fact.
What makes this case important isn't just that an error occurred—intelligence failures happen. What matters is how the system failed to correct itself. Contrary information was available. Skepticism existed within the intelligence community. But institutional momentum, political pressure, and the conviction that Saddam possessed weapons created a tunnel vision that filtered out doubt.
This is why the Curveball case remains relevant. It's a documented example of how even powerful institutions with resources, expertise, and access to classified information can be wrong about something fundamental. It shows how a single unreliable source can drive foreign policy if no one is willing to genuinely question the narrative. And it demonstrates why public skepticism toward official claims—especially those used to justify military action—isn't cynicism. It's learning from history.
Beat the odds
This had a 1% chance of leaking — someone talked anyway.
Conspirators
~1,000Large op
Secret kept
2.6 years
Time to 95% exposure
500+ years
